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Foreword: Federalism and Anti-
Federalism as Civil Rights Tools*
CHARLES F. ABERNATHY*
The focus on Civil Rights and the Supreme Court 1994 Term in
this issue of the Howard Law Journal has one relatively consistent
underlying theme-the role of federalist and anti-federalist arguments
in the formulation of civil rights policy. As you might expect, there is
not much dispute among the authors about the proper goals of civil
rights law, for virtually every author in this issue is in one sense or
another a traditionalist on policy. So the policy goals are somewhat
uniform: promotion of "more" civil rights, promotion of affirmative
action and race-based quotas, promotion of race-consciousness in
districting.
What separates the authors is their instrumentalist arguments;
that is, how they would accomplish their goals. Because this is
America, where levels of government may compete to promote or re-
tard political agendas, the authors' thoughts naturally turn to federal-
ism, and on the federalism issue they divide. Some are traditional
federalists, supporting the federal role for civil rights and lamenting
any possible decline in federal power. Others have given up on the
federal government and argue for a return to states' rights, or at least
for a much diminished federal role in superintending state efforts to
promote the traditional civil rights agenda.
Although the articles and essays diverge on their substantive pro-
posals, some federalist and some anti-federalist, virtually all have one
common thread. Federalism, for it or against it, is only a tool to be
used in promoting their agendas. Some of the proposals would have
been deemed heretical only a few decades ago, among them a call for
massive resistance to the federal government's role in civil rights, at
* Copyright © 1996 by Charles F. Abernathy.
* Author, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LrrIGATION (2d ed. 1992); Adjunct Pro-
fessor of Law, Howard University School of Law, 1995.
1996 Vol. 39 N.. 3
Howard Law Journal
least to its role in retarding the use of affirmative-action remedies.
Others may write about what the new civil rights movement should
aspire to attain. But for the traditionalists represented in this issue,
the issue is not the agenda, it's how to accomplish the agenda. Feder-
alism and anti-federalism are mere tools to be worked.
This Foreword serves not only to link together the common
message of many different authors, it also acts as an introduction and
commentary about the thoughts that populate this issue of the Jour-
nal. I share some criticisms as I review these articles, but because I
must necessarily capsulize and truncate some of the authors' views in
this introduction, my criticism comes with the caveat that I have taken
the various authors' views as jumping-off points for further discussion.
Any criticism is more of where the authors' ideas may lead than it is a
criticism of the authors themselves.
Although my main focus is on the authors' use of federalist and
anti-federalist themes, I am concerned about one deeper problem dis-
played in all the papers: how does one argue to persuade others about
civil rights policy? How does one argue to others about appropriate
tools if they are not already deeply committed to underlying policy?
Many of these papers are frankly and openly result-oriented, and
whether with self-awareness or not, the authors preach to the choir,
they argue to the already committed. With some notable exceptions,
there is very little attempt to persuade non-believers to accede to the
authors' suggestions, either as to policy or tools, including the tool of
federalism. How would these articles be written if the audience
needed to be persuaded?
I. FEDERALISM AND DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS: J.
CLAY SMITH, JR.
Professor Smith in Shifts and Implications of Federalism for Civil
Rights1 has once again carefully defined his topic, and it is the topic
that has traditionally formed the core issue in civil rights-the role of
the federal government in protecting less powerful minorities. In
United States v. Lopez,' the Supreme Court found the federal Gun-
Free School Zone Act of 1990 unconstitutional because it exceeded
Congress's authority under the commerce clause and thus intruded on
1. J. Clay Smith, Jr., Shifts and Implications of Federalism for Civil Rights, 39 How. L.J.
737 (1996).
2. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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powers reserved to the states. The Lopez case, joined with this Term's
recent decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,3 marks the re-
turn of federalism as an important issue at the Supreme Court.
Professor Smith has raised the issue of whether recent federalism
cases have implications for civil rights enforcement, particularly for
the constitutionality of important civil rights laws passed under Con-
gress's Commerce Clause power.4 Balancing concern with an appreci-
ation for the possibility of over-reading Lopez, Professor Smith notes
that the decision itself is less important-and less worrisome to civil
rights advocates-than the reasoning that is offered up by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. I agree with much of what Profes-
sor Smith argues and add only two specific comments.
Is Lopez the augury of a future restricted view of the Commerce
Clause so that civil rights might once again be placed beyond the pale
of federal control? I doubt it. As Professor Smith argues so well, con-
curring justices specifically stated their continued support for impor-
tant precedents upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Professor
Smith's overall thesis-that tone is as important to a holding as its
specific rationale-provides valuable insights when reading these con-
curring opinions. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor appear to me to be
reluctant and limited joiners of the majority opinion. Theirs is more a
statement of outer jurisprudential boundaries than predictors of their
future voting behavior.
Another active Commerce Clause case from last Term supports
my view of the limited nature of the Lopez holding, even its specific
exaltation of schools as a matter of local concern. In the heyday of the
old Court's restricted Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court ac-
tively used the "local activity" doctrine to strike down federal legisla-
tion, and quintessential among the activities considered local was
mining.5 If one expected a bold return of the "local activity" doctrine,
therefore, one would reasonably expect to see it applied to mining
activities.
3. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v, Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
4. Titles II and VI! of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e (1988), are
the most important of these statutes, and they deal specifically with racial discrimination in pub-
lic intercourse-restaurants, hotels, amusements, and jobs.
5. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (coal mining is a local activity). See
generally United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (discussing such "local" activi-
ties as "manufacture, agriculture, mining").
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Yet in United States v. Robertson,6 decided the same Term as Lo-
pez, the Supreme Court summarily rejected the contention that the
gold mining at issue was a local activity or that the distinction was
relevant because, in that case, the mined products themselves had
moved in interstate commerce.7 This decision, upholding a RICO
conviction, tells us much about the limited holding in Lopez. As Pro-
fessor Smith so carefully argues, the economic integration of the na-
tion now leaves so many products actually moving in interstate
commerce that the Lopez rationale has much less force than it did in
the 1890s. Lopez, therefore, tells us more about the Court's tone than
about its willingness actually to use such old-fashioned doctrines.8
Even if federal power remains strong, another set of questions
remains. Is unrestrained federal power in the best interest of civil
rights advocates? And are all persons who worry about unlimited fed-
eral power anti-civil-rights? Professor Smith is worried that more in-
quiring judicial scrutiny may lead to limiting congressional power
under the commerce clause. I am more ambivalent. I agree that tra-
ditionally civil rights has been peculiarly the concern of the federal
legislature and federal judiciary.9 But the two branches are not neces-
sarily the same in either goals or effects, and of the two, the traditional
position in American constitutional law has been that the Supreme
Court-not Congress-is the ultimate arbiter of what statutes are or
are not constitutional.'" And this is true of federal as well as state
laws) To that extent, therefore, Justice Rehnquist's statement in Lo-
pez that the Supreme Court should ultimately decide whether Con-
6. United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 1733.
8. Professor Smith does not discuss a related Commerce Clause issue, whether Lopez sug-
gests the demise of federal regulation of state and local governments under Title VII. Regula-
tion for court-declared constitutional violations, for example, the Fourteenth Amendment's ban
on intentional discrimination, seems secure. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Con-
gress may use § 5 power to regulate state entities without violating Eleventh Amendment)
(Rehnquist, J.). The problem area after Lopez, and especially Seminole Tribe, is federal regula-
tion under the Commerce Clause for non-Fourteenth-Amendment violations, such as violations
of Title Vll's ban on effects-type discrimination. For example, EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226
(1983). which upheld a Title VII analogue-the Age Discrimination in Employment Act-in this
context, now appears vulnerable.
9. CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 508 (2d ed.
1992).
10. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
11. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (equal protection principles inherent in
the Fourteenth Amendment will also be applied by the Court to control federal legislation).
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gress has exceeded its power 12 is a position as familiar as the
statement from Marbury v. Madison.13
The traditional federalist approach to finessing the issue of judi-
cial or congressional supremacy has been the rational basis test, or
equivalents, when reviewing federal legislation alleged to exceed con-
gressional power. 14  Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez uses this ap-
proach to uphold the gun-control statute at issue there. But in Justice
Breyer's hands, the rational basis test turns out to be a total abdica-
tion of judicial review: it is difficult to see how his "house-that-jack-
built" argument-connecting guns to reduced studying, to reduced ed-
ucation, to reduced job skills, to reduced movement of businesses
across state lines15-would ever result in a federal statute being held
unconstitutional. Certainly Justice Breyer's willingness to buy the
Brooklyn Bridge of legal arguments casts no doubt on Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 6 or Katzenbach v. McClung,7 where
the evidence of the impact of racial discrimination on interstate com-
merce was overwhelming18 and immediate.' 9
12. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 n.2 (1995) ("[W]hether particular oper-
ations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Con-
gress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be
settled finally only by this Court." (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring))).
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
14. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) ("rational basis"); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964) ("real and substantial relation").
15. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1659-61 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
17. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
18. Everyone, especially younger Americans, should re-read the factual background against
which Congress acted. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, for example, the evidence showed that because
of local acts of racial discrimination, African-Americans often had to drive far off their route to
find food and accommodations. This not only impaired the interstate mobility of African-Amer-
icans who chose to travel, the uncertainty that it caused also "had the effect of discouraging
travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro community." Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379
U.S. at 253 (citation omitted).
19. It is true that the McClung case contains what might be called a chain-of-events argu-
ment to show an impact on interstate commerce. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 300 (racial discrimi-
nation by restaurants deterred professional people from moving to area where discrimination
was practiced, and this in turn deterred companies from moving to such new locations because
professional people would not move there). This chain, however, is not only considerably
shorter (companies with interstate operations will not move to some states because their profes-
sional employees refuse to go along) than the one hypothesized by Justice Breyer in Lopez, it is
in many respects no different from causal chains recognized in even early twentieth-century
Commerce Clause cases. See Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (defective
train cars used only in intrastate commerce may affect interstate trains to which they are cou-
pled; Federal Safety Appliance Act regulation upheld). Had the 1990 Congress evidenced, even
secondarily, any desire to protect interstate movements by business, Breyer's argued connection
might have been more persuasive.
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While Professor Smith is worried about the Supreme Court that
struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, I am worried about the
Congress that passed it. The Lopez decision calls into serious ques-
tion the traditional assumption that the federal legislature is always on
the side of the angels and civil rights interests. At a time when young
African-American males are being incarcerated at alarming rates, civil
rights advocates should be wary of another law that denies local au-
thorities the power to deal with school problems in a non-criminal
manner.20 When federal politicians are left with the choice of sensi-
tively dealing with minority concerns or riding tall in the anti-crime
saddle, riding tall is too often the winner, especially in an election
year.
II. FEDERALISM AND DEFERENCE TO LOWER FEDERAL
COURTS: MARK TUSHNET, JOSE FELIPE
ANDERSON, AND PATRICIA BRANNAN
Professors Tushnet and Anderson and Ms. Brannan touch an-
other sensitive nerve that civil rights advocates have also finessed, the
issue of the degree of deference that should be accorded lower federal
courts in formulating remedial decrees that cure prior constitutional
violations. The traditional law here could not be clearer to state or
more ambiguous to apply: the scope of the permissible remedy should
be determined by the scope of the violation to be cured.2 Civil rights
advocates, especially those on the Supreme Court, have traditionally
emphasized that this rule reflects equitable concerns that require def-
Even as a chain-of-events argument, the observation in McClung is offered only in secon-
dary support. It is contained as the last sentence in a paragraph about the "direct and highly
restrictive" effect of not being able to eat on the travel practices of African-Americans. Racial
discrimination by restaurants "obviously discourages travel and obstructs interstate commerce
[by African-Americans] for one can hardly travel without eating." McClung, 379 U.S. at 300.
All of the evidence was carefully documented in congressional hearings. See id. McClung easily
survives Lopez.
20. The defendant in Lopez undoubtedly subjected his fellow students to substantial danger
when he brought a handgun and bullets to his high school. It was also a crime under Texas law.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995). There is no indication whatsoever in the
case record or in Congress' records that the individual federal prosecution was brought or the
statute was enacted because Congress feared that a young Hispanic man would not be fairly
treated in Texas or other state courts. Indeed, in general state courts provide more methods for
disposing of criminal charges against young people than are available in federal courts.
21. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) ("Milliken I/') (also recognizing two other
factors to be considered: that the relief actually be remedial and that some deference be shown
to local authorities); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (court
may only remedy "incremental segregative effect" caused by unconstitutional discrimination, not
other segregation that was not unconstitutional).
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erence to the local federal judge's insight in picking and choosing
among various available alternatives to formulate an effective rem-
edy.2 Justices concerned with the limits of federalism have empha-
sized that whatever remedy is formulated must not exceed the original
constitutional violation, or else federal judges are constituted social
legislators to accomplish their view of the social (non-constitutional)
good.23
As demonstrated in Missouri v. Jenkins,24 these differing views
have now become refined to a set of positions that remarkably parallel
those found in the federalism debate in the Lopez case.
For traditional liberals, as noted above, the assumed answer here
is to trust in district judges, giving them the same broad deference in
the desegregation context that liberals on the Court would have given
to Congress in the Lopez case; lax rationality review accomplishes this
goal. 5 For traditional conservatives the answer is to rein in district
court judges by demanding a greater connection between remedy and
violation, ensuring that their chosen remedial decrees do not become
subterfuges for solving a range of social ills not fairly presented in the
original litigation; some type of mid-level review accomplishes this
goal. 6 Indeed, the split in the justices in the Jenkins case exactly mir-
rors that in Lopez, with the five-person majority demanding more ex-
acting review and the four dissenters echoing their Lopez plea that
more discretion be accorded to the policymakers who are under
review.
Professor Tushnet in The "We've Done Enough" Theory of De-
segregation2" puts the Court's decision last Term in Missouri v. Jenkins
into historical perspective and comes to the conclusion that "white
America" has once again committed itself to social equality for Afri-
22. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (court may enjoin action that is not itself
unconstitutional if to do so relieves other conditions that are unconstitutional) (prison litigation);
cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (emphasizing similar remedial discretion
in Title VII litigation).
23. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (finding de jure segregation in
part of a school district does not authorize judge to impose remedy for other de facto segrega-
tion); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (termination of decree when
relief has achieved goal).
24. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) [hereinafter Jenkins 1111.
25. See id. at 2073-91 (Souter, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 2042-56. Although Justice Rehnquist plays up the bright-line error of the
district judge in Kansas City-using an interdistrict remedy for an intradistrict violation-the
much stronger theme from the majority opinion is the tension between deferential rationality-
type review of district court desegregation orders and more exacting mid-level review.
27. Mark V. Tushnet, The "We've Done Enough" Theory of Desegregation, 39 How. L.J.
767 (1996).
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can-Americans only to decide some years later that it is tired of the
commitment, that it has "done enough." The late twentieth century
appears in this regard to be imitating the late nineteenth, Professor
Tushnet would say, as revolutionary fervor wanes and social equality
for African-Americans is left only partially attained.28 Professor
Tushnet presses the argument that desegregation law is merely "de-
segregation politics." There can be little doubt that, at least over the
course of decades, as described by Tushnet, politics becomes law as
Presidents and parties win elections, again at least partly, on the
promise of changing the Supreme Court's personnel and policies.
In this historical context, Professor Tushnet sees his role as an-
swering an all-important practical, political question: what more
could the federal courts have done to accomplish desegregation? An
implicit answer is offered, Tushnet suggesting that what the trial court
wanted to do in Kansas City-induce voluntary white integration
rather than compel it through busing-was the "more" that should
have been tried. There are problems with this argument, not the least
of which is that the social scientists and their work, on which Tushnet
had earlier relied, fail to support his position. 9 His general political
view, therefore, must be supported by trotting out the usual bad ac-
tors-in general, "Republicans" who set traps to "weaken Democratic
strength," and in particular, Republican nominee Barry Goldwater
and President Richard Nixon.3"
In Tushnet's world, therefore, "more" ultimately becomes, like
"enough," a symbol for a political position rather than a plan of at-
tack. Implicit in his argument is the traditional liberal assumption that
the federal courts can be trusted to decide when enough has in fact
been done. Yet, by stereotyping the opposition to further desegrega-
tion efforts, calling them "white America," my colleague begs two
very difficult questions. Why would persons of goodwill think that
Kansas City's school desegregation remedy went too far? And maybe
the "more" that comes from deference sometimes amounts to "less"
for civil rights?
28. Cf KENNETH M. STAMPP, TtE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1865 (1965) (docu-
menting shift in social attitudes toward newly freed slaves immediately after end of Civil War);
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating 1875 Civil Rights Act).
29. See Tushnet, supra note 27, at 770 & n.25.
30. Id. at 770-71. Tushnet does not pause to reflect on the apparent irony that Republican
judicial nominee Souter wrote the dissenting opinion in Jenkins. Perhaps a Harvard Law School
education shapes more views than does politics? Or perhaps Professor Tushnet's stereotype of
Republicans and "white America" is unhelpfully broad?
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Professor Anderson, in Perspectives on Missouri v. Jenkins: Aban-
doning the Unfinished Business of Public School Desegregation "With
All Deliberate Speed",3 picks up the discussion where Professor
Tushnet ends, turning us toward the issue of what remedies should be
on the judicial agenda and who should decide how much is enough.
Professor Anderson notes that education "represents the largest ex-
penditure for local government" 32 and that the Kansas City district
court's remedial decree certainly raises concerns that the intervention
of one federal judge into the local community to spend its money on
desegregating schools should be used with caution.
33
Although Anderson ultimately would himself have done more,
his approach identifies the gravest political challenge to plaintiffs' de-
segregation orthodoxy. On one side, the orthodoxy always demands
"more" because it views the harms of segregation as unimaginably
high for most African-Americans.' 4 But the word "more" has no
limit, as the Kansas City case so readily exemplifies. When the case
earlier came to the Supreme Court, the desegregation bill of $142 mil-
lion in operating expenses and $187 million in capital improvements
looked so high that the Court ducked the very issue of its appropriate-
ness.35 By the time Jenkins III arrived only five years later, the figure
had ballooned to over $1.4 billion dollars, over a half-billion dollars
for capital improvements alone.36 To show for that expenditure, the
school board and district court had a model United Nations, a plane-
tarium, an art gallery, a bevy of enclosed swimming pools, air-condi-
tioning for all classrooms, an animal farm, and a host of other
educational frills.37 But there was little trustworthy or quantifiable
31. Jose F. Anderson, Perspectives on Missouri v. Jenkins: Abandoning the Unfinished Busi-
ness of Public School Desegregation "With All Deliberate Speed", 39 How. L.J. 693 (1996).
32. Id. at 709-10.
33. Id. at 710.
34. Justice Ginsburg is in this respect a traditional liberal. See Jenkins III, 115 S. Ct. 2038,
2091 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Given the deep, inglorious history of segregation in Mis-
souri, to curtail desegregation at this time and in this manner is an action at once too swift and
too soon.") (emphasis added).
35. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 53 (1990) [hereinafter Jenkins II].
36. See Jenkins 111, 115 s. Ct. at 2043-44 ("quality education" programs such as full-day
kindergarten, $220 million; magnet schools program, $448 million; capital improvements, $540
million; salary assistance, $200 million). The total of these components is over $1.4 billion.
37. Id. at 2044-45. It startles me that neither Professor Tushnet nor Professor Anderson, in
arguing for "more," cites all that the school system had already acquired. Exactly what "more"
would have proved helpful, "more" of "more"? In my yearly class in Civil Rights, taught ordina-
rily at Georgetown University Law Center and this year also at Howard University School of
Law, I teach the Milliken doctrine by giving hypothetical decrees that the student must then link
up to underlying violations. When I gave them the relief awarded in the Jenkins litigation as a
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improvement in black educational attainment in return for these vast
expenditures, and students in the Kansas City schools continued to
perform at or below national norms in many grades.38
That there were no vast improvements in black education should
not be surprising, for the avowed purpose for the court-ordered im-
provements, according to Tushnet and the Court, was to attract white
students to the schools, not to raise black educational attainment.
Benefits to the African-American community appear to have been
small, and not inconsequential was what Professor Anderson alludes
to as the cost to the community at large. In an era of scarce public
resources, every expenditure on a natatorium for indoor swimming
competes dollar-for-dollar with a new child-care center, an immuniza-
tion program, or a private citizen's choice of how to raise her children.
Politically, the only reason that the Kansas City decree lasted as long
as it did was this: the plaintiffs and the school board had agreed non-
adversarially39 to an expensive decree-and then sent most of the
enormous bill to the state. 40 These expenditures were insulated from
competition from other valid public and private uses.
Although this criticism of the district court may seem harsh, I be-
lieve that it is probably too modest. Though attracting white students
might have been a goal for some participants in creating the decree,
others were quite probably motivated by a more general desire to
"upgrade" public education. Just as the American Bar Association
and American Association of Law Schools have worked hard in re-
cent years to upgrade legal education, the school board in Kansas City
worked to upgrade its educational program.41 Under this scenario,
even Professor Tushnet's assumption that the trial court was accu-
rately pursuing an integrationist strategy becomes problematic. Gen-
eral educational improvement in a community is a laudable goal, but
so are many others-from cleaning the environment to protecting ten-
part of a "hypothetical" case, substantial numbers of students at both law schools began to laugh
at what they considered my absurd example.
38. Id. at 2046.
39. See id. at 2042 (school board was original plaintiff in the action against the state and was
later realigned as a "nominal defendant"); id. at 2044 (school board has pursued a "friendly
adversary" relationship with the plaintiffs).
40. Id. at 2045 (Missouri, "through the operation of joint-and-several liability, has borne the
brunt of these costs.").
41. It is not surprising that the efforts to upgrade have been accompanied by ever-increas-
ing tuition bills for students. Upgrades cost money. In the legal education market, consumers
can decide if they want the product offered, subject to suits against such entities as the A.B.A.
for violating the antitrust laws. In Kansas City the court's decree might be seen as helping
school professionals control the market.
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ants in public housing. Indeed, the general goal of upgrading all pub-
lic education is in competition with the specific civil rights goal of
aiding minority educational opportunities.42
This very difficult "scarce-resources" dilemma expands upon fed-
eralism issues raised in the Lopez case by pointing out that federalism
takes on special concerns when the issues of horizontally separating
governmental powers are added to the issues of vertically separating
power. Virtually echoing the Lopez majority, Professor Anderson
notes that education is the most important function of local govern-
ment.43 Federal decrees, he implies, interfere with the necessary give-
and-take at the local level for allocating scarce resources. The central
tenet, I suppose, is that a federally announced interest in school deseg-
regation does not make that interest more important-at least not
limitlessly more important-than fighting crime in Gary or dirty water
in Boston. The horizontal component of separation of powers notes
that it is an unelected judge that is doing the allocating of scarce re-
sources, defensible within limits when the issue involves a cure of con-
stitutional violations-Marbury v. Madison and all that-but not
defensible when the judge and collusive adversaries are setting out
toward an extra-curative agenda."
Professor Anderson would ultimately solve the problem by coun-
seling courts to avoid painting with a broad brush, instead narrowly
focusing on the remedial nature of each individual decree.45 Patricia
A. Brannan in Missouri v. Jenkins: The Supreme Court Reconsiders
School Desegregation in Kansas City, Criteria for Unitary Status, and
42. In my Civil Rights Policy Seminar some students argue at this stage that the "scarce
resources" argument fails because "the rich" (or some similar group) always get the lion's share
of public dollars, so civil rights is competing with them, not "good" alternatives such as environ-
mental clean-ups. I think that there is much to this argument (though the stereotyping of "the
rich" bothers me). Nevertheless, to the extent that some public servants have used the civil
rights agenda, specifically the desegregation agenda, to raise teachers' salaries, upgrade school
construction, and create programs they would have favored even in the absence of a desegrega-
tion decree, they have merely used the civil rights agenda-hijacked the civil rights agenda-to
serve other competing interests.
43. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 709-10.
44. Cf James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott's Unwon Freedonv The Redistricting Cases as
Badges of Slavery, 39 How. L.J. 633, 686 (arguing in favor of less federal interference in redis-
tricting and asserting that "the greatest victories" for civil rights have come from "fairly negoti-
ated compromises").
45. The difficulty of the issue can be seen in one question: How much of the $1.4 billion
spent under the Kansas City decree was necessary, and how much was hijacked for other non-
desegregation goals?
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Remedies Reaching Beyond School District Lines 6 picks up the dis-
cussion at this point and gives us a litigator's hopeful view of how
Jenkins will ultimately be received. She makes two very relevant early
points. First, Jenkins must be read in context with its companion case,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,47 and both together suggest a
more demanding Supreme Court review of claimed curative goals,
whether promoted by Congress or the lower courts.48 Second, the
narrow precedential issue before the Court in Jenkins, salary in-
creases, may actually be unaffected as it relates to most ordinary de-
crees. As Brannan points out, salary increases for instruction
personnel are much easier to link to curative goals,49 while across-the-
board increases raise suspicions about an end-run on collective bar-
gaining. The problem with the Kansas City decree, therefore, was its
breathtaking breadth: starting first with teachers, the court later
awarded assistance to each of the 5,000 school board employees, save
three.50
Brannan's insight about the connection between relief decrees
and affirmative action is also an important counterpoint to Professor
Tushnet's thesis that what is always needed in civil rights is "more."
By pursuing such goals as "desegregative attractiveness," the district
court had embarked on a journey "without any objective limitation, '51
thus implicating a basic concern of even liberal affirmative-action
plans-that there must be some time limit on the benefits that are to
be reallocated pursuant to a curative rationale. 52 Otherwise, the ben-
efits of the curative decree fall increasingly on a set of persons who
are new to schooling and thus never actually suffered the harms of the
46. Patricia A. Brannan, Missouri v. Jenkins: The Supreme Court Reconsiders School De-
segregation in Kansas City, Criteria for Unitary Status, and Remedies Reaching Beyond School
District Lines, 39 How. L.J. 781 (1996).
47. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (requiring courts to use
strict scrutiny when reviewing racial preference programs, whether established by federal, state,
or local government).
48. See Brannan, supra note 46, at 789.
49. See id. at 790-91.
50. Jenkins 11I, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 (1995).
51. id. at 2054. It seems to me that the Court has not articulated precisely its concern with
these words. If the Court were concerned with "objective" measures alone, the district court's
choice of nationwide educational norms would be an "objective" measure for determining the
end to the decree. The Court's concern, as Ms. Brannan suggests, is that the relief does not
objectively correlate with the underlying violation. Thus, "desegregative attractiveness" fails be-
cause it is a variation of Professor Tushnet's argument: there could always be "more."
52. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (affirmative action pro-
gram permissible under Title VII as a "temporary measure"); cf Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (court supervision is a "temporary measure").
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school board's past segregation. Those who actually suffered, mean-
while, have now left the system and are effectively uncompensated for
their loss. 53
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE NEW ANTI-
FEDERALISM: IVAN BODENSTEINER, STANLEY
FISH, AND JAMES BLACKSHER
The modern affirmative action controversy stands traditional lib-
eralism on its head, not in the usual way that posits that liberalism's
racial neutrality is corrupted by racial consciousness, but in the more
instrumental way that shows that federalism is a neutral concept,
neither more nor less favorable to civil rights goals. The assumption
of traditional civil rights advocates, exemplified in this issue of the
Journal by Professor Tushnet's defense of federal court remedial de-
crees and Professor Smith's implied defense of federal congressional
power, has assumed that the federal judiciary is the trustworthy de-
fender of the civil rights community. The present affirmative action
controversy should reacquaint us with the notion that federal politics
may be just another venue for resolving conflict, not a guarantee of
success for traditional civil rights positions.
The core issue in the affirmative action debate today centers on
whether we should accept only the curative rationale for race- con-
scious remedies, the same curative rationale at the basis of federal
judicial power in the Jenkins case. This returns us once again to a pure
issue of federalism, but this time with the shoe on the other foot-for
the ascendant Supreme Court majority now becomes the federalist
Court, overturning state decision-making that would recognize a
wider role for affirmative action. In a sense, therefore, the debate
about affirmative action takes us back to Professor Smith's discussion
of federalism, but now in the purely judicial context and with all roles
reversed.
A. Result-Oriented Jurisprudence and the New Anti-Federalism
Professor Bodensteiner argues the need for further affirmative
action,54 but in a curious fashion that bows to traditional liberal con-
53. As I said earlier, the authors in this issue are traditionalists in civil rights. A more
avant-garde group might have seriously asked why we are so preoccupied with the "system" and
cures within it. Why not just pay reparations to all those wronged by prior desegregation?
54. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Affirmative Action-The Need for Leadership, 39 How. L.J. 757
(1996).
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cerns even as it disavows them. He invokes the traditional liberal
"meritocracy" litany that insists that affirmative action is not antitheti-
cal to concern with ability to perform; 55 the sole purpose of affirma-
tive action is to remove the distortions caused by lingering effects of
prior racial discrimination.56 His discussion of affirmative action that
involves quotas or specific allocation of jobs by race, and of whites'
reactions to it,57 comes directly from the Brennan Court's Title VII
cases of the 1970's.58 Like the majority in those cases, he concludes
that "[tlhe remedial purpose assumes evidence of prior
discrimination. 59
Yet Professor Bodensteiner's god, like most, resides in the details,
and his definition of what is being cured is not identifiable, on-site
discrimination, as in Croson,60 but the discriminatory assumption that
white males are competent: "[a]ffirmative action is warranted as long
as this assumption and burden remain."61 When, the modern Court
might ask, will there be an end to race-consciousness? Professor
Bodensteiner suggests that forty years is not yet a good start; the
Court is suggesting that it is a good end.62 Professor Bodensteiner
further complicates his theology by departing from his curative ration-
ale when he suddenly recognizes "diversity" as an independent, addi-
tional justification for affirmative action. 63 What "diversity" has to do
with curing past discrimination he does not say, but the modem
Court's refrain might well be the same: so long as there are distinct
minority groups, when will affirmative action end?
By failing to see any need for limits or by lacking any apprecia-
tion that people of good will might want limits, Professor Boden-
55. Id. at 757-58.
56. See id. at 757.
57. See id. at 757-58.
58. Compare id. at 758 (equal opportunity in employment cannot be assured simply by end-
ing discriminatory practices; rather, "the employer must take some affirmative steps to assure
that it is really an equal opportunity employer") with Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747 (1976) (remedial decree in Title VII case must put discriminatees in their "rightful place,"
where they would have been "but for" discrimination) and United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (voluntary affirmative action not illegal under Title VII, despite
"literal" language to contrary, because act was aimed at past "centuries of racial injustice").
59. Bodensteiner, supra note 54. at 760.
60. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
61. Bodensteiner, supra note 54, at 757.
62. Professor Bodensteiner later concedes that "[r]easonable people may differ" on the is-
sue of whether forty years has brought substantial improvement in racial equality. Id. at 764.
His sole complaint is that equality is not yet "full"; in other words, he wants the unquantifiable
,more."
63. Id. at 764.
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steiner replicates Professor Tushnet's position that "more" is needed
without specifying the limits of "more." 64 His own discussion suggests
a need for limits: does he seriously believe that an employer should
be able to base its hiring on race just because that would make the
employer "more accepted in a community [by] reflect[ing] the racial
composition of its customers"? 65 The lower courts have decidedly re-
jected the "customer preference" idea in the context of sex discrimi-
nation,66 and the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the idea that
a school district should have a racial proportion of teachers that
matches that of its customers, the students enrolled.67 The argument
is more a defense of Hooters' desire to hire attractive young females
than it is a defense of affirmative action-unless one appreciates what
is never explicitly articulated in his argument, that it applies only to
racial considerations favoring minorities. Professor Bodensteiner
never articulates a justification for this position: is it the curative ra-
tionale in disguise?
Although he follows most traditional civil rights arguments, Pro-
fessor Bodensteiner ultimately refuses to replicate the traditional civil
rights position that the federal Congress can do no wrong on civil
rights. He distrusts Congress, the President, and "the majority of peo-
ple in this country. ' 68 He wants private actors as well as state and
local government to be more assertive for affirmative action. Perhaps
it is not a call to "massive resistance," but now that the federal gov-
ernment is not on his side, Professor Bodensteiner has become an
anti-federalist.
Joining Professor Bodensteiner's camp is Stanley Fish, who has
presented us with a joyously witty and revealing piece, At the Federal-
ist Society.69 Although he has nothing to say about federalism-the
only author in this 1994 Term focus uninterested in the topic-he joins
Professor Bodensteiner in tone and feel, ardently rejecting anyone
who does not agree with the current pro-affirmative-action agenda.
Attending the annual Federalist Society meeting as one of "a small
64. At least Professor Tushnet notes that the literature leaves in doubt the benefits of af-
firmative integration; to Professor Bodensteiner this is just more obvious "common sense." See
id. at 764.
65. Id. at 764.
66. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting customer-
preference defense to excuse practice of hiring only female flight attendants).
67. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 313 n.21 (1977).
68. Bodensteiner, supra note 54, at 765.
69. Stanley Fish, At the Federalist Society, 39 How. L.J. 719 (1996).
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chorus of designated scapegoats,' 70 Fish shows us that he is the one
committed non-traditionalist represented in this issue. Going beyond
Professor Bodensteiner's conflicted commitment to both "curative"
and "diversity" rationales for affirmative action, Fish explicitly rejects
"universal principles like equality and color-blindedness" as mere
"relativism."'" He would instead "rely upon the norms, histories, and
practices" of his and other racial and gender groups.72 Thus, he notes,
Dinesh D'Souza "thinks it's relativism when you take race, gender,
and group history into account in your decisions about hiring and col-
lege admission. I think it's relativism when you don't."73
It is Fish's thinking that is relativism, in the sense of being purely
instrumentalist, and he admits it with pride.74 This, he argues, is what
makes conflict, and from the conflict choices must be made. This is an
only slightly skewed version of the now-familiar argument from Criti-
cal Legal Studies that all law is indeterminate and subject to manipu-
lation by the advocate and judge. 5 And the problem with the
argument is that it usually stops at this point, failing to proceed to
persuade us which side of a moral argument should prevail. Ulti-
mately, Fish runs the risk of preaching to the choir just as he accuses
the Federalists of doing.
Fish admirably tries to avoid failure to persuade by attaching
what he curiously calls his "appendix" of well-rehearsed arguments on
affirmative action. It is telling, however, that he only rehearses and
challenges the arguments against affirmative action, not the argu-
ments in favor of it. And in challenging the opponents of affirmative
action, he thinks he has winners when, in reality, he has answers that
only persuade himself.76 In any event, Fish's argument from relativ-
ism must by definition appeal to shared values; the broader the shared
70. Id. at 722.
71. Id. at 724.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515
(1991).
76. Take Fish's number six, for example, which focuses on the idea that because the viola-
tion was aimed at the group AA, so must the remedy be group-oriented on all members of the
group AA. See Fish, supra note 68, at 731. This is, of course, only half the equation, for while
one violator from group W may have focused on group AA, that violator's own co-group mem-
bers have not. Perhaps Fish is right and the remedy should run in favor of all in group AA, but
should it run against all in group W? If an African-American kills a non-African-American
because he is prejudiced against all non-African-Americans, should all non-African-Americans
have a remedy against the killer alone? Against all African-Americans?
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values, the greater the chances of persuasion. Fish can be seen as a
partner of Professor Bodensteiner, therefore, on the federalism issue:
if he can win at the federal level, he would be a federalist; if not, he
would be an anti-federalist.
B. Beyond Anti-Federalism: Removing the Federal Courts from
Racial Districting.
James Blacksher's thoughtful article on affirmative action in re-
districting, Dred Scott's Unwon Freedom: The Redistricting Cases as
Badges of Slavery," is a back-to-the-future piece, taking civil rights
law back to its roots. Praising Justices Frankfurter and O'Connor for
their opposition to federal judicial supervision of legislative and con-
gressional districting, he calls for an end to strict scrutiny of the use of
race in creating majority-minority districts.78 Alternatively, he would
recognize conscious affirmative inclusion of African-Americans as a
compelling state interest justifying race-conscious districting.79
Key to Blacksher's argument is an even older notion, the concept
of the Constitution and constitutional law as contractarian enterprises
in which the legitimacy of government depends on the assent of the
governed. 0 He argues that majority-minority districts are necessary if
American society is to allow all of the governed, including African-
Americans, to have a voice in American political life. The title's allu-
sion to Dred Scott is part of the working hypothesis, for Blacksher
argues that African-Americans were incapacitated by slavery and thus
could not consent to join the American compact-a condition that, he
argues, continued even after freedom.8
The contractarian view of constitutional law is somewhat quaint
these days, at least in academia. Professor Tushnet and his fellow
"crits" would be amused, perhaps, at the re-birth of the doctrine in
this new guise. But in vogue or not, the contract notion is an adequate
vehicle for raising essentially the same issue presented in this issue's
other articles on affirmative action: should African-Americans par-
ticipate in elections in a race-neutral manner, individually (as voters)
cutting deals, or failing to do so, along with all individuals in Ameri-
can life? In this scenario, any "black" interests are represented by the
77. Blacksher, supra note 44, at 633.
78. See id. at 635-36.
79. Id. at 636.
80. Id. at 636-39.
81. Id. at 639-40.
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representative who is elected. Alternatively, should African-Ameri-
cans be represented by other African-Americans? Under this scena-
rio, "black" interests would be brokered by the representative
directly.
Blacksher's thesis is not a political one; he does not argue that
one scenario or the other is more effective or authentic for represent-
ing African-Americans.82 His point is that the first scenario is neces-
sary to integrate African-Americans into the national system of
government, to induce assent to the contract. Otherwise, the badges
of slavery that prevented original assent will be perpetuated.
83
As Blacksher himself recognizes, federalism has historically been
an instrumentalist proposition when the issue is voting.' He wants
the Court to be receptive to race-conscious districting by tolerating it;
normally anti-federalist supporters of strict scrutiny in voting-that is,
essentially the majority in the Lopez case-here stand for federalizing
a rule against affirmative action. On this issue, Blacksher finds him-
self in somewhat the same uneasy position-in favor of federalizing
some issues on African-American voting,85 but against federalizing
majority-minority districting rules.86 One need not buy the conspiracy
aspects of Blacksher's arguments, that the Court's redistricting cases
are a conscious "strategy for reuniting querulous whites around their
nonblackness, ' 87 to recognize that federalism is also a tool in search of
users.
Welcome to this review of Civil Rights and the 1994 Supreme
Court Term. Federalism is the issue at its core, but other issues
abound.
82. But see id. 678-79 (no formal assent need be required; a "real" political dialogue by
empowered African-Americans is all that is needed).
83. Id. at 662.
84. See id. at 664-65.
85. He favors the Voting Rights Act of 1982, for example, and its favorable "results" test.
See id. at 663.
86. See id. at 693 ("My own experience with twenty years of voting rights litigation has
convinced me that the greatest victories legal action has achieved for black plaintiffs, for black
and white communities, and for American democracy came not from judicial decrees, but from
fairly negotiated compromises between black and white political leaders.").
87. Id at 673.
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